1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	DWIGHT L. ARMSTRONG (BAR NO. 07: JOHN M. SCHEPPACH (BAR NO. 240633 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP 1900 Main Street, Fifth Floor Irvine, California 92614-7321 Phone: (949) 553-1313 Fax: (949) 553-8354 E-Mail: darmstrong@allenmatkins.com jscheppach@allenmatkins.com  Attorneys for Defendant CR&R INCORPORATED  UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
10			
11	KARLA VELASCO,	Case No. 8:15-cv-01962	
12	Plaintiff,		
13	VS.	DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER	
14 15	CR&R INCORPORATED and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,	28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1441(a)	
	Defendants.		
16 17	TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED	STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE	
18	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
19			
20	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant CR&R Incorporated ("CR&R" or "Defendant") hereby removes to the United States District Court for the Central District of		
21	"Defendant") hereby removes to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the action pending in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the		
22	County of Orange, Case No. 30-2015-00810297-CU-WT-CJC, based on federal-question		
23	jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a), for the reasons and on the grounds		
24			
25	stated below.		
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- 2. The 30-day removal period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) does not commence until proper service of the state-court summons and complaint under the relevant state law, *Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.*, 526 U.S. 344, 354 (1999), which here is California law.
- 3. On October 26, 2015, Defendant's counsel signed and dated an Acknowledgment of Receipt, accepting service of the Summons and Complaint in the State Court Action. On October 26, 2015, Defendant's counsel sent correspondence to Plaintiff's counsel, enclosing the executed Acknowledgment of Receipt. A true and correct copy of this correspondence is attached as **Exhibit B**.
- 4. Under California law, "service . . . is deemed complete on the date written acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed, if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(c). Accordingly, here, service was deemed complete on October 26, 2015.
- 5. Defendant's removal is timely in that this Notice of Removal has been filed within thirty (30) days of the execution of the Acknowledgment of Receipt. *See Chissie v. Winco Foods, LLC*, No. 2:09-cv-02915-MCE-KJM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12333, at \*5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010).
- 6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), a copy of this Notice of Removal with its attachments will be promptly served on Plaintiff's counsel, and notice thereof will be filed with the Clerk of the Orange County Superior Court.

8. CR&R is the only named defendant which has been served with the state-court Summons and Complaint. The remaining defendants are all fictitious "DOE" defendants. DOE defendants are not required to join in removal. *Riggs v. Plaid Pantries, Inc.*, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (D. Or. 2001).

## REMOVAL BASED ON FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION

- 9. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a removing defendant must provide a "short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" in its notice of removal.
- 10. As discussed below, this action is one which may be removed to this federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) because the existence of a claim alleged under a federal statute, the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), creates federal-question jurisdiction. Moreover, supplemental jurisdiction exists over the remaining claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
- 11. Plaintiff's Complaint in the State Court Action alleges five claims or causes of action: (1) violation of the California Family Rights Act (asserted under California Government Code § 12945.2); (2) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (asserted under 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 *et seq.*); (3) retaliation (asserted under California Government Code § 12940(h)); (4) failure to prevent retaliation (asserted under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act); and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
- 13. The second cause of action in the Complaint is asserted under a federal statute, *i.e.*, the FMLA. (Compl. p. 8.) Moreover, in the second cause of action, Plaintiff's Complaint seeks remedies under the FMLA, including liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A). (Compl. ¶ 46.) Accordingly, the second cause of action arises under federal law and creates federal-question jurisdiction.

1 14. Supplemental jurisdiction exists over the four remaining claims in the Complaint because they are so related to the federal FMLA claim that they form "part of the 2 same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Indeed, all of Plaintiff's claims in the Complaint arise out of Plaintiff's termination of employment, which allegedly violated the 4 5 FMLA and state law. (Compl. ¶¶ 30-31.) Moreover, the allegations that underlie the federal FMLA claim are specifically incorporated by reference into three other claims. (See Compl. 6 7 ¶¶ 47, 55, 62.) Finally, Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for wrongful termination specifically invokes the "fundamental" public policy behind the "Family and Medical Leave Act." 8  $(Compl. \ \ \ \ 63.)^1$ 10 15. In short, this case is properly removable to federal court. Plaintiff's second 11 cause of action under the FMLA gives rise to federal-question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction exists over the remaining claims. 12 13 Dated: November 23, 2015 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE 14 MALLORY & NATSIS LLP 15 DWIGHT L. ARMSTRONG JOHN M. SCHEPPACH 16 By: /s/ John M. Scheppach 17 JOHN M. SCHEPPACH Attorneys for Defendant 18 CR&R INCORPORATED 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff's invocation of the FMLA in her fifth cause action could also separately support

Plaintiff's invocation of the FMLA in her fifth cause action could also separately support an independent basis for federal-question jurisdiction.